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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 981736-CA 
vs. : 
SHANE MARK KARTCHNER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled substance, a 
third-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998) in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of 
the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Where an officer stopped to assist defendant following a 
bicycle accident, did the trial court correctly determine that 
the officer's requests for defendant's name did not constitute 
a seizure? 
"This court has previously noted 'no analytical distinction among a trial court's 
determinations of when a seizure occurs, of reasonable suspicion, or of voluntary consent 
for purposes of the applicable standard of review.'" State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985 
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 465 n.3 (Utah App. 1991)), cert. 
denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). n[W]hether a particular set of facts gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. The legal 
standard for reasonable suspicion, however, i s highly fact dependent and the fact patterns 
are quite variable.9 The legal standard therefore conveys a measure of discretion to the 
trial court in our application of the correctness standard to a given set of facts." State v. 
Chapman. 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 
(Utah 1994) (citations omitted)). 
2. When defendant hesitated to give the officer his name and admitted he 
"might" or "may" have an outstanding warrant, was the officer's 
detention of defendant pending completion of a warrants check 
supported by reasonable suspicion? 
The standard of review for determining whether a detention was supported by 
reasonable suspicion is set forth under Issue No. 1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was arrested and charged with one count of possession of a contro' 
substance, a thud dilutee feluii) uiidni I ll ill I INIIII 'IIIIIII ft SK ] 1 8(JlUiilil I I11'1' I mini inie 
count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class-B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37a-5 (1998) (R. 4-6). He moved to suppress the drugs and drug paraphernalia (R. 
26-31) Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 136-38), 
Defendant pled guilty to one coui it of possession ol .i lonliollcil vii'lisLiiiiie 11! ! Ill'» -
67) Ilii In ill IIIIIII in mi if ii »M nil i suspended snitnuT off) 5 w ,ir ini| ii'is* mment, ani ,1 I? 
months in jail (stayed pending appeal) to be followed by three years probation (R. 171-
72). In addition, defendant was ordered to pay an SI.850.00 fine (R. 172). 
Defendant filed a timely notice 
S - '• • * n 
Officer Michael Ashley was patrolli^e 3900 South in Salt Lake City in the late 
afternoon of October 18, 1997 (R. 85-86, 95). As Ashley traveled east toward State 
Street in "fairly heavy" traffic, he saw defendant standing in the middle of the right 
( a - * 
Ashley turned
 o n his overhead lights and stopped traffic "so i>iviCiiv^ AA«.j **im* . get 
run over," and got out of his car to assist defendant (id., R, 97 ] ~ Pendant said that he 
had just "wrecked" on his bike (R. 8"H \shley noticed scrapes on defendants cibows, 
and asked hii i I if he needed i i lediu .v • C;U,-J. ;., .. d 
3 
not (R. 97, 184 at 7). 
When defendant refused medical treatment, Ashley asked defendant's name. As 
Ashley explained, "I just told him I needed his name so I could do the report" (R. 99, 184 
at 9-10). "Anytime I do this [,] any kind of accident of this sor t . . . I always get the name 
so I can do a report so that we're not liable later on . . . down the road" (R. 101). When 
defendant declined to give his name, Ashley repeated the request for defendant's name 
"two or three times" (R. 184 at 7, 9). 
Ashley then asked defendant, "Do you have any warrants?" (R. 184 at 7). 
According to Ashley, Defendant responded "I may have one, something to that effect, I 
might have one" or " I 'm not sure if I have one'" (R. 101, 184 at 7-8). Defendant then 
told Ashley his name (R. 184 at 7). Ashley told defendant to wait while Ashley ran a 
warrants check (R. 100-01, 184 at 8). 
The warrants check confirmed that defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant (R. 
88).l Ashley asked defendant if he had any weapons, and defendant handed over a knife 
(id.). Ashley then placed defendant under arrest for the warrant (R. 89). Ashley searched 
defendant's backpack incident to the arrest and found three baggies of methamphetamine, 
along with a syringe and a glass pipe which Ashley recognized as drug paraphernalia (R. 
89-91). Defendant admitted that the drugs and paraphernalia were his, and was 
!The record does not reveal the charges supporting the arrest warrant. 
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criminally charged with their possession (R. 5-6, 91). 
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the drugs and drug paraphernalia, the 
i.-.u. J ourt stated I .1 n ) Hiding a detention ml1 in lai 1 (Iitu w ua a ildi/ntmii, 1mm CUT 
limited if wis did nnl nrnir iinhil nifl MIIIT tilt1 dHniditiil Iml in ulr (dm statrninil nhoul 
the possibility of an outstanding warrant"' (R. 184 at 20', Addendum A). The court 
concluded that "[b]ased on the defendant's refusal to give the Deputy his name, coupled 
\s iUi Lite dciciiddiii > auiiii^^i^n 'mat
 tic piouaDi> u^ .*i.-,i^ .,Jing arrest warrants, the 
existence of warrants" (R. 138, Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant anrues uuxi he was unlr 
c | u i i p; / t o 
"jrJ - ^ -'.'*r(:c t.> defendant following a bicycle aeuJcin. As the officer explained to 
defendant and later testified, he requested defendant's name in order to complete his 
accident report.. No physical, force or show of authority were employed that would have 
Hi ill1 mi i i:jsoii»ib!e pci iiui In IK.lit \ c lit *,\as hung nit laiiiii ill m u s inni(idII I in i ill In 
Identity, I Jnder the circumstances, no seizure occurred. 
Defendant next argues that he was unlawfully detained when, after defendant 
indicated that he "might" have an outstanding warrant, the officer told him, to wait while 
the officer deiennii.wu uwicnuani s warrants' slulus, Dcleiulunl 's uu \ ilhngncss In gn v Ins 
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name, coupled with his admission to the officer that he "might" or "may" have an 
outstanding warrant created a reasonable suspicion that defendant was subject to arrest. 
Because it was based on reasonable suspicion, defendant's brief detention during the 
warrants check did not offend the Fourth Amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT UNREASONABLY DETAINED SIMPLY 
BECAUSE OFFICER ASHLEY ASKED HIM HIS NAME 
FOR ACCIDENT REPORTING PURPOSES 
Defendant does not question the fact that when Deputy Ashley stopped his patrol 
car, turned on his overhead lights, approached defendant and inquired about his need for 
medical assistance, the officer was acting appropriately in his role as a community 
caretaker. Appellant's Brief at 11. Defendant acknowledges that the officer's actions 
were justified at their inception. Id. However, he maintains that when the officer asked 
defendant's name, he detained defendant, and such detention amounted to a unlawful 
seizure unsupported by reasonable suspicion. Appellant's Brief at 10, 12-14. 
A. The Officer's Requests for Defendant's Name Did Not Constitute a 
"Seizure" Because a Reasonable Person Would Not Have Considered 
Himself Detained Under the Circumstances, 
"Not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen is a seizure." Florida 
v. Bostick. 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). MA person is seized under the Fourth Amendment 
when, considering the totality of the circumstances, the police conduct would have 
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officer's 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter and go about his or her business." State v, 
Higgins. stw t. ,*.*«;,./ i, viiaLuu^n e 
* a 
individual." State v Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah App. 1991) (citing ^ , w v. Truiillo. 
739P.2d85587(Utah App: i - 7 ) 
"Generally, a seizure does not occur where an officer simply approaches an 
v\ i ii rvi|uesN idcnlitu:atiuii. Inn,/ the 
tad lii.il an o niter identifies himself as a police officer does not convert a consensual 
encounter into a seizure.""""" Carter, 812 P.2d at 463 (citations omitted); see also State v. 
Jackson. 805 P,2d ?6* ^68 (Utah App. 1990) (as a matte- . :^\ - request for 
. u . i w a l l - . I . w i i i l . M / l l l O H S l l l l l k d "".III II! i t l l l l h **" * III III I I III1 I III III 
seizure) 2 
"[Interrogation relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the 
police does not, by itself,, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure I Mess the 
circumstances ot the eiitounlei die i.n iiiliiiiiiiliiliim as in nit iimnsli.ik illlial a IL'JSI umahle 
1 he u:^.>; :,,u u) dcienudiit in support of his contention tl lat an unreasonable 
seizure occurred are inapplicable because, in every cited case, the officers were clear!) 
questioning the suspect for a criminal investigatory purpose. In this case, the officer was 
not investigating a crime, but was attempting to document his activities after coming upon 
the scene of a accident and stopping to render aid (R, 184 at 16-17). 
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person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot 
say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment." I.N.S. v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984). In I.N.S. v. Delgado, immigration officials in search 
of illegal aliens questioned factory workers about their identity and immigration status 
while other agents were stationed at the factory exits. The court found that the 
questioning of individual workers was brief and noncoercive, and ruled that no detention 
or "reasonable threat of detention" occurred. Id. at 219. The court rejected the workers' 
contention that, under the circumstances, the workers "reasonably feared that refusing to 
answer would have resulted in their arrest." Id. at 220. As the court wrote, "it was 
obvious from the beginning of the surveys that the INS agents were only questioning 
people." Id. at 220. In this case, as in I.N.S., the officer's requests for defendant's name 
were brief and would not have caused any reasonable person to believe that he or she 
would be detained for failing to answer. 
This Court has recognized certain factors tending to indicate a seizure has 
occurred: (1) the threatening presence of several uniformed officers; (2) the display of a 
weapon by an officer; (3) physical touching of the individual; or (4) the use of language 
or voice tone threatening to the individual. State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655, 658 (Utah 
App. 1996); State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah App. 1991). None of those factors 
was present during Officer Ashley's requests for defendant's name. Although defendant 
implies that the officer's requests for defendant's name escalated into a demand, the 
8 
evidence reflects simply that Ashley "just told him I needed his name so I could do the 
report." Appellant's Brief at 13, R. 99. The trial court rejected any suggestion that the 
officer's demeanor or tone of voice amounted to a show of authority, observing that the 
officer's "voice is rather soft-spoken. His demeanor is not the least bit aggressive 
[H]is physical stature is not imposing Therefore, his mere request of the defendant 
for a name, in and of itself, is not improper" (R. 184 at 17-18, Addendum A). See State 
v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah App. 1990) (no seizure where nothing in record 
indicated officer acted in a way that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he or 
she was compelled to produce identification, or that he or she could not freely walk 
away). 
Similarly without merit is defendant's contention that he was "directly confronted 
by a uniformed, armed officer" whose vehicle's "emergency lights . . . were activated" 
and that, under those circumstances, he "submitted to Deputy Ashley's show of 
authority." Appellant's Brief at 15. The record does not reflect that Officer Ashley drew 
his gun, or that defendant was intimidated by the officer's uniform. Furthermore, as the 
trial court found, the officer's overhead lights were illuminated for a clear public safety 
purpose; i.e., to divert traffic from the accident site (R.184 at 16, Addendum A). The trial 
court correctly observed that under those circumstances it would be "absurd" to consider 
use of the officer's overhead lights as a "seizure" (Id.). 
"[T]he 'reasonable person' test presupposes an innocent person." Florida v. 
Bostick. 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (emphasis in original). Therefore, in determining 
whether a reasonable person would have believed he was seized under the circumstances, 
defendant's guilty state of mind and fear of being apprehended for previous criminal 
activity are not relevant. No reasonable person in defendant's circumstances — i.e., 
standing in traffic next to a wrecked bicycle, having just been ejected from the bicycle's 
seat ~ would regard an officer's use of his lights as a show of authority calculated to 
effect a detention for criminal investigatory purposes. Indeed, a reasonable person in 
defendant's circumstances would have been grateful for the officer's assistance, and 
would have recognized that the officer's request for identity was legitimate for record 
keeping purposes. 
Here, the officer stopped to render assistance to defendant after a bicycle accident. 
The officer noted scrapes on defendant's elbows, but defendant refused medical 
assistance. The officer stated that he asked for defendant's name in order to file a report 
of the accident. His purpose was to minimize any concerns of police liability that might 
arise in the event that defendant had been injured more seriously than he acknowledged 
himself to be (R. 101).3 His requests for defendant's name were directly related to the 
purpose for his intervention, and did not amount to an unreasonable restraint on 
defendant's liberty. 
3The record does not reflect whether defendant was wearing a bicycle helmet, but 
it is self-evident that a bicyclist is vulnerable and exposed to injury in an accident. 
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As the trial court properly found: 
We live in a society in which litigation is prevalent, both criminal and civil. 
Officers can no longer expect that as they do their job there is not going to 
be a need to later account for what is being done. Therefore, I'm sure it is 
policy and practice to make a report of every episode that occurs, not just 
criminal conduct but accidents such as this. So to make inquiry of this 
individual who had obviously been in an accident of some sort and to ask 
that person his name is not unreasonable, does not constitute any kind of 
seizure or search or limitation of his freedom, nor is it improper. 
(R. 184 at 16-17, Addendum A). 
POINTII 
THE OFFICER'S DETENTION OF DEFENDANT 
DURING THE WARRANTS CHECK WAS 
SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION 
In challenging the officer's detention of defendant during the warrants check, 
defendant maintains that the trial court clearly erred in finding that M[t]he Deputy then 
asked if the defendant had outstanding arrest warrants and the defendant responded that 
he probably did" (R. 137, Addendum B). Appellant's Brief at 7-8. Defendant also claims 
that the trial court erred in concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain 
defendant while the officer ran a warrants check. 
The constitution does not forbid all searches and seizures, only unreasonable ones. 
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1994). "To 
determine whether a search or seizure is constitutionally reasonable, we make a dual 
inquiry" (1) Was the police officer's action 'justified at its inception'? and (2) Was the 
11 
resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place'?" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32 (quoting Jerry, 392 U.S. 19-
20). 
A. The Trial Court's Finding that Defendant Admitted that He "Probably" 
Had an Outstanding Arrest Warrant was Supported by the Record. 
The officer testified that defendant said that he "may" or "might" have an 
outstanding warrant, or that he was "not sure" whether he had an outstanding warrant (R. 
101, 194 at 7-8). That testimony, in defendant's view, was inadequate to support the trial 
court's finding that defendant admitted to the officer that he "probably" had a warrant. 
However, the officer also testified that "[h]e told me he probably had a warrant" and 
affirmed that defendant "led [him] to believe that there may be one" (R. 101, 184 at 7). 
The officer's testimony concerning defendant's reply, while varying in its exact 
terminology, consistently reflected defendant's admission that it was likely that he had an 
outstanding arrest warrant. Taken as a whole, the officer's testimony indicates that 
defendant's response could be (and was) interpreted to mean that it was probable that 
defendant had an outstanding warrant. Therefore, the trial court's finding accurately 
reflected the substance of defendant's response. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that Defendant's Reluctance to Give 
His Name, Coupled with His Admission that He May Have Had an 
Outstanding Warrant Provided Reasonable Suspicion Supporting His 
Detention During the Warrants Check, 
A detention must be based on articulable facts which, together with rational 
12 
inferences drawn from them, would lead a reasonable person to conclude defendant had 
committed or was about to commit a crime. State v. Potter. 863 P.2d 40, 43 (Utah App. 
1993); State v. Svkes. 840 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah App. 1992). The articulable facts "must 
be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by 
those versed in the field of law enforcement... Thus, we review the basis for the 
intrusion to determine whether the officer 'observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot." 
State v. Munsen. 821 P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted), cert, denied. 843 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
"[A] warrants check is a useful and efficient weapon in the standard police arsenal 
for dealing with suspicious persons." Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1007 
(Utah App. 1996). An officer's conducting a warrants check during the course of a 
traffic stop or other lawful detention does not violate the Fourth Amendment, so long as it 
does not significantly extend the period of detention. State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 
452-53 (Utah 1995); State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994) (noting impact of 
warrants check upon scope of detention is minimal due to efficiency of computerized data 
storage while governmental interest in arresting citizens with outstanding warrants is 
substantial). 
In this case, as the trial court determined, defendant declined to give his name 
under circumstances in which it would have been reasonable for him to do so (R. 184 at 
13 
18, 21, Addendum A). In addition, he responded equivocally to the officer's question 
concerning whether he had an outstanding warrant. Defendant's admission that he 
"might" have a warrant was an acknowledgment that he "might" be subject to arrest. 
Taken in combination, defendant's hesitancy to reveal his name and his admission 
that he "might" have a warrant were sufficient to create a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that defendant had been involved in criminal activity, or was otherwise subject to an order 
of arrest. The most direct and expeditious means of determining whether the reasonable 
suspicion was founded was to conduct a warrants check. Consequently, the officer's brief 
detention of defendant during the warrants check was reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendants' convictions. 
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activity. He stated that Mr. Kartchner had done 
nothing wrong, that he had violated no traffic 
ordinances . 
And under those circumstances, the resulting 
detention was unlawful. And the fruit of that 
unlawful detention must be suppressed. 
THE COURT: All right. It will be the ruling 
of the Court that the motion to suppress is denied. 
This Court, first addressing the issue of the 
activation of the takedown lights, finds that it is 
absurd to consider that a seizure. There are a 
variety of reasons for activating lights, many of them 
or even most of them having to do with public safety, 
having to do with stopping traffic to insure safety. 
The mere fact that somebody turns on their lights in a 
patrol car in the process of rendering aid, which is 
clearly what was contemplated here, is not any kind of 
seizure. And had Mr. Kartchner given his name, he not 
had warrants or indicated the same, he would have been 
free to go about his business. 
We live in a society in which litigation is 
prevalent, both criminal and civil. Officers can no 
longer expect that as they do their job there is not 
going to be a need to later account for what is being 
done. Therefore, I'm sure it is policy and practice 
16 
to make a report of every episode that occurs, not 
just criminal conduct but accidents such as this. So 
to make inquiry of this individual who had obviously 
been in an accident of some sort and to ask that 
person his name is not unreasonable, does not 
constitute any kind of seizure or search or limitation 
of his freedom, nor is it improper. 
I hope we never reach a point in time where 
law enforcement is precluded from asking citizens what 
their names are. Because if we get to that point, 
there is no ability of the police to help us protect 
our citizenry and do their job. 
In this case I have taken into account, not 
only the testimony of Detective Ashley and the 
totality of the facts and circumstances, but also this 
morning his demeanor. I note for the record that he 
is not a particularly large, imposing man. His 
demeanor is that of a gentle man -- and 1 pause 
between "gentle" and "man." He also is apparently a 
gentleman. His voice is rather soft-spoken. His 
demeanor is not the least bit aggressive. His voice 
is not in any way imposing or impressive or out of the 
ordinary, and his physical stature is not imposing. 
There are certainly officers of whom that would not be 
true. Therefore, his mere request of the defendant 
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for a name, in and of itself, is not improper. 
It's this Court's finding that the 
defendant's refusal to give that name -- while 
certainly it may be within his rights to do so --
coupled with his later indication that he might have a 
warrant, instead of saying "certainly not" or some 
other thing indicating the clear absence of a warrant, 
creates a reasonable suspicion of improper conduct and 
would allow for a short-term, minimal detention if 
nothing else were revealed. And that is precisely 
what occurred. 
We're not talking about any kind of major 
intrusion into the defendant's freedom. He was not 
even cuffed at that point in time. What we're talking 
about is a mere request for the defendant to stay 
there for a moment while a check was made. 
Arguably it wasn't even a seizure at that 
point in time. But I think the better ruling is, it 
was a limited seizure that was proper, both in terms 
of the underlying motivation for the same, the basis 
for the same, as well as the scope and the manner in 
which it was handled. There is nothing here to 
suggest any impropriety in the police's conduct or 
handling of this matter. And for those reasons, I am 
denying the Motion to Suppress. 
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And I will say further that I do not 
consider this to be the same scenario as in Brown v. 
Texas. In that case obviously we had two people 
walking down the street. There was no reason for the 
police to get involved. There wasn't an accident; 
there wasn't any kind of need to render assistance or 
gather further data. In this case it is 
uncontroverted that there was an accident. There was 
a reason for a good police officer to get involved to 
render assistance• 
We seem to have reached a point in this 
country in our present time where all police motives 
are suspect. And that is simply not the case. And 
where a police officer does one of the things that he 
or she is supposed to do -- and that is, renders 
assistance where someone appears to be clearly in 
need -- this is not improper. This is, in fact, what 
we want of our police officers. And that is what 
commenced in this scenario. And that makes it very 
different than the Brown v. Texas case, and it's a 
different scenario with the different result. 
There is certainly a different basis for the 
inquiry as to a name. It's not just to harass. It's 
to be able to prepare a report in case of civil 
litigation, and so that the officer can document his 
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time, et cetera. And for all of these reasons I have 
ruled as I have. 
I am going to ask, Mr. Kouris, that you 
prepare findings consistent with but not limited to 
what I have said, consistent with the testimony both 
today from the officer and to the preliminary hearing, 
referencing with specificity the facts. And let me be 
clear: I am finding a detention -- if, in fact, there 
was a detention, however limited it was -- did not 
occur until and after the defendant had made the 
statement about the possibility of an outstanding 
warrant. 
Now, you have had your hand up for about 
five minutes, Mr. Dellapiana. What would you like to 
ask or to say? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge, I just wanted a 
clarification as to your finding on reasonable 
suspicion. The way you phrased it is, the refusal to 
give the name coupled with the subsequent comment 
about maybe having warrants constituted reasonable 
suspicion. Would you be willing to make a finding one 
way or another as to refusing to give one's name, in 
and of itself? 
THE COURT: No, I would not. That's why I 
said "coupled with," and apparently you heard that 
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language. The mere refusal to give the name -- and I 
am absolutely certain I said this before, I will say 
it again -- is not wrong. I believe I said, and I 
will say it again, every citizen has the right to 
refuse to give their name. But if, under 
circumstances where there is no real reason not to 
give your name, and if, in addition to that, someone 
makes a statement that it is possible that they have a 
warrant, those things together give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion in my opinion. And that's why I 
said "coupled with,11 not standing alone. 
I will add that it is very likely that the 
statement about the possibility of the existence of a 
warrant, standing alone, would probably be sufficient. 
But we don't need to look at it as sufficient because 
it is coupled with other conduct. 
When viewed in the totality -- and that's 
the important thing here. All of the cases as we all 
know on search and seizure are totality-of-the-
circumstances cases. And in this case there is no 
exception. It's the totality that I have considered: 
The demeanor of the officer, the manner in which the 
defendant came to his attention, the manner in which 
the defendant comported himself from the moment that 
the two came into contact with one another. 
21 
Any other questions by way of clarification? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Not from me/ your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Kartchner needs to visit. 
Take some time. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Nothing further from us, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me suggest that I 
think we have a couple of remaining issues. And that 
has to do, or those issues have to do with setting a 
trial date and pressing forward on this. My 
understanding is we do not currently have a trial 
date • 
MR. KOURIS: That's correct, Judge. 
THE COURT: When would you all be ready to 
try this? 
MR. KOURIS: Judge, it was the State's 
understanding that this issue would be dispositive of 
the matter. And whether that's still the case, I 
don't know. That was the premise we looked at. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Dellapiana? 
MR. DELLAPIANA: If we could chat for just a 
second. 
THE COURT: Let's do this. Why don't you 
gentlemen take as much time as you want, certainly at 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo.971019499FS 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed on the above captioned matter, was 
heard by this Court on June 4, 1998, at 8:30 A.M. Defendant was present and represented by 
Ralph Dellapiana. The State of Utah was represented by Mark S. Kouris, Deputy District 
Attorney. Testimony was taken by one witness and both parties briefed and argued the pertinent 
issues. Being fully advised, the Court makes the following Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The State of Utah charged the defendant by Information of Unlawful Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, to wit: Methamphetamine; and Unlawful Possession of 
Drug Paraphernalia. 
2. The State based its Information on activities occurring on October 18, 1997 at 50 
West 3900 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
131 
JUN 9 1998 
SALT LAK£ CCl/.MTY 
By r>nirr^\ k 
On that date. Sheriffs Deputy Michael A. Ashley traveled eastbound on 3900 
South and noticed the defendant standing on the street at about 50 West. 
For traffic management and the defendant's safety, Deputy Ashley activated his 
overhead lights and exited his vehicle to assist the defendant. 
The defendant explained that he had wrecked his bicycle on the road. 
Despite scrape marks on the defendant's elbows, the defendant refused medical 
assistance. 
Based on the refusal of medical treatment, Deputy Ashley inquired as to the 
defendant's name for completion of his accident report and the defendant refused 
to provide it. 
The Deputy then asked if the defendant had outstanding arrest warrants and the 
defendant responded that he probably did. 
At that time the Deputy directed the defendant to "wait" while he confirmed the 
existence of warrants. 
The Deputy confirmed outstanding warrants for the defendant and placed him 
under arrest. 
During a search incident to arrest, the Deputy found three small bags of an off 
white powder, a syringe and a glass tube. 
The defendant then admitted that the powder and paraphernalia belonged to him. 
The defendant also admitted that he ingested the substance on two occasions 
earlier that day. 
Deputy Ashley field-tested the powder and it tested positive for the presence of 
methamphetamine. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The activation of the Deputy's vehicle's overhead lights did not constitute a 
seizure as its stated and obvious purpose was to facilitate public safety. 
Based on the defendant's refusal to give the Deputy his name, coupled with the 
defendant's admission that he probably had outstanding arrest warrants, the 
Deputy had reasonable suspicion to direct the defendant to wait while he checked 
for the existence of warrants. 
n^ 




A. LEWIS, Judge 
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Approved as to form: 
Ralph Dellapiana 
Attorney for the Defendant 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
MARX S. KOURIS, 6594 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 







Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law and having entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law based thereon: 
The Court hereby orders that defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied. 
DATED this L '"'"day of ;' • , : 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Sul/Ut 
// 
LESLIE A. LEWIS, Judge 
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